

# CONNECTED AND AUTOMATED VEHICLES

## *Cybersecurity Concerns for Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems*

October 2021


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

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# ARILOU AUTOMOTIVE CYBERSECURITY


YOUR TRUSTED INDEPENDENT SECURITY PARTNER

- Automotive cybersecurity pioneer since 2012
- Independent member of global automotive software supplier, **NNG** Group, since 2016
- **SENTINEL** – Firewall & Intrusion Detection/Prevention Systems (IDS/IPS):
  - **SENTINEL-ETH** – IDS/IPS for Automotive Ethernet
  - **SENTINEL-CAN** – IDS/IPS for CAN bus and SAE J1939 commercial vehicles
- **Secure-Boot for ECUs**
- **Professional services:**
  - **ISO/SAE 21434** – Consulting for compliance
  - **TARA** – Automotive Threat Analysis & Risk Assessment




# AGENDA

- New technologies
- Attack scenarios
- Protection methods



# 01

## NEW TECHNOLOGIES



# CURRENT STATE OF AUTOMOTIVE CYBERSECURITY

- Migration from CAN bus to Automotive Ethernet –
  - Ethernet, IP and other well-known protocols by hackers
  - Multiple known public exposures
  - Many readily available attack tools
- Complexity
  - Newly developed software – new vulnerabilities
  - High computerization – higher risks
  - Increased connectivity – more potential attack vectors
- Major concerns to **safety, reliability** and **privacy**
- Growing cyber-threats and industry awareness but no major incidents yet with casualties or physical damage
- UNECE WP.29 UNR 155 as of 2022 as a driving force for increased cybersecurity protection



# WHAT IS V2X?

*Vehicles and infrastructure exchanging unmanaged messages*




Photo Source: U.S. DOT

# DO NOT PASS WARNING



Photo Source: Getty Images

# LEFT TURN ASSIST



Photo Source: Cadillac




# TRAFFIC LIGHT ASSISTANT




# CONNECTED VEHICLES AND V2X

- Most vehicles are connected to the internet via cellular interface (infotainment, telematics, electronic data recorders, insurance company dongles, etc.) – there are many attack options
- V2X will be a major platform for inter-vehicle comms, in addition to comms between the vehicle and multiple entities – a basis for many exciting applications, but also cyber risk.



# AUTOMATED DRIVING

- Increase in human reliance on software to drive the vehicle – potentially severe repercussions in case of a cyber attack
- Automated driving depends on complex software - susceptible to flaws that can result in exposures



# CONNECTED AND AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES (CAV)


- The combination of automated driving and vehicle connectivity multiplies the cyber risk

a.k.a CAD (Connected and Automated Driving)



# CO-OPERATIVE DRIVING

- Co-operative Intelligent Transportation Systems (C-ITS) allow vehicles to communicate enabling optimal traffic conditions and safety on the roads. Multiple vehicles can be attacked at once creating an amplification effect. Harder to contain.
- Increased software complexity - more potential attack scenarios and risks



# 02

## ATTACK SCENARIOS




# V2X OBU (ON BOARD UNIT) CYBERSECURITY


*C-V2X case attack vector example*

**REMOTE ATTACKS ARE THE MOST SEVERE  
THREAT TO THE VEHICLE**

- Incoming traffic from the cellular network




# THREATS TO CONFIDENTIALITY







# THREATS TO INTEGRITY




# THREATS TO AVAILABILITY




# THREATS TO NON-REPUDIATION




# THREATS TO AUTHENTICITY



# THREATS TO ACCOUNTABILITY



# THREATS TO AUTHORIZATION




# 03

## PROTECTION OPTIONS



# CRYPTOGRAPHIC MECHANISM

- Important tool but not sufficient. No protection against compromised devices.
- Cannot validate the contents of the message





# OBU CYBERSECURITY

*Protection on two fronts*


## INSPECTING THE CELLULAR – INCOMING TRAFFIC

Incoming cellular traffic to the OBU should be inspected in case the OBU is the target – or used as a bridge to the in-vehicle network.

## INSPECTING THE IN-VEHICLE TRAFFIC

Incoming and outgoing CANbus traffic should be inspected to prevent attack on the OBU or on other ECUs

New emerging Automotive Ethernet has grater risks



# PLAUSIBILITY VERIFICATION

- **Range plausibility:** Check if the position of the sender is inside the maximum range
- **Position plausibility:** Check if the position of the sender is at a plausible place (e.g., on a road, no overlaps with physical obstacles, etc.).
- **Speed plausibility:** Check if the speed advertised by the sender is less than a predefined threshold.

# PLAUSIBILITY VERIFICATION

- **Position consistency:** Check if two consecutive beacons coming from the same sender have plausible separating distance.
- **Speed consistency:** Check if two consecutive beacons coming from the same sender have plausible acceleration or deceleration.
- **Position speed consistency:** Check if two consecutive beacons coming from the same sender have consistent speed and separating distance.


# PLAUSIBILITY VERIFICATION

- **Beacon frequency:** Check if the beacon frequency of a sender is compliant with the standards.
- **Position heading consistency:** Check if the positions in two consecutive beacons coming from a same sender correspond to the heading advertised by that sender.
- **Intersection check:** Check if no two beacons coming from two different senders have overlapping locations (i.e., both senders overlap each other).
- **Sudden appearance:** Check if no sender suddenly appeared within a certain range/distance.

# EXAMPLE OF MISBEHAVIOR


## FAKE EEBL (EARLY EMERGENCY BRAKE LIGHT)

- Message plausibility can be checked using sensor fusion by comparing the signal strength (RSSI) from the physical layer and compare it with the vehicle locations (GNSS and V2X message)



# MISBEHAVIOR DETECTION PROCESS

- **Data capture** - definition of the types of data and information that can be captured from different sources, including automotive, infrastructure, original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and suppliers, for misbehavior detection.
- **Detection** - analysis of the data captured to detect misbehavior.




# MISBEHAVIOR REACTION SCALE

- No reaction
- Warning message is sent to the vehicle
- Warning point is deducted from the vehicle's score
- Passive revocation where the vehicle cannot request more certificates
- Active revocation where the current certificates of the vehicle are revoked (CRL)




# DETECTION AND REVOCATION SCOPE





# MISBEHAVIOR DETECTION END-TO-END PROCESS



# TAKE HOME MESSAGES

- V2X cybersecurity needs to be addressed from day zero with a secure by design approach
- Regulation will be a major driving force, but corporate and organizational responsibility is equally important
- A multi-layer, defense-in-depth approach is required to protect the V2X traffic in the OBU
- Secure software and hardware development & testing in addition to functional safety
- Dedicated, devoted, and independent protection components such as firewalls, IDS and IPS to oversee the whole V2X traffic
- Use professional companies to guide and support you along the way
- For more information, please see our web site <https://ariloutech.com/>
- Please follow us on LinkedIn <https://www.linkedin.com/company/arilou/>



# ARILOU

Automotive Cybersecurity  
Part of NNG Group

## THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION!

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