irdeto

Building a Secure Future.™

Deploying Cybersecurity in Current and Future Vehicles

Return of Experience Sessions

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Trends & Forces

Automation

Mobility



Electrification

Connectivity

Security

84%

have concerns that cybersecurity practices are not keeping pace with evolving technologies

30%

do not have an established product cybersecurity program or team

63%

test less than half of hardware, software, and other technologies for vulnerabilities

Ponemon INSTITUTE

Single Points of Failure are a Weakness


CAUTION!
Unintended
Consequences
Ahead


UNIT TESTS PASSING
NO INTEGRATION TESTS
imgflip.com

Bolt-On Security has the Same Issues

Think like a Hacker

- 2015 - Jeep Hack
- 2016 - Key Fob Hack on 90% of VWs
- 2017 - 150 Jeep Wranglers stolen in San Diego
- 2017 - 11 Teslas Stolen in Netherlands
- 2018 - Keyless entry car theft triples in UK
- 2018 - Keen Labs BMW Hack
- 2019 – BMW stolen in 20 secs in UK

THE TOTAL NUMBER OF INCIDENTS IS ON A SHARP RISE

Upstream

Q1 2019 sees rapid growth of automotive cyber incidents



How do we Respond?

- Good security starts with good security architecture and design.
- High availability and high confidence with the assurance that any possible attacks are anticipated
- The system needs to self-defend. Self-repair, self-healing, and fault-tolerant systems can deal with the immediate threat of malicious faults; while telemetry monitoring, policy updates, and system updates (OTA) can address recovery of unanticipated compromises, reducing even the remote possibility of widespread problems in a fleet.

Current Guidelines and Recommendations may be Insufficient

- The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) report on Cybersecurity Best Practices for Modern Vehicles recommends, “Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover”.
- Well, when you’re driving down the highway, it could be a long time between Identify and Recover, if is all happening in the cloud (“Please wait while the countermeasure to your cybersecurity threat downloads”)

U.S. Department of Transportation
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

NHTSA

Technology

China's NIO Causes Chaos After Smartcar Shuts Down on Highway

Tian Ying
January 30, 2019, 11:00 PM EST

A driver in central Beijing found out the hard way that upgrading software on a smartcar in the middle of traffic isn't such a good idea.

Potential customers test driving an electric vehicle made by Chinese startup NIO Inc. decided to download the latest operating system while on the road, triggering a shutdown of the car, Chinese media Caixin reported. The stall resulted in a traffic snarl on the city's Chang'an Avenue, which passes between the Forbidden City and Tiananmen Square.

Off-Vehicle Process is Important



Off-Vehicle Process is Important

But Not Sufficient



High Availability for Automotive Cybersecurity

High Availability for Automotive Cybersecurity

Availability%	Downtime per year
90% ("one nine")	36.5 days
99% ("two nines")	3.65 days
99.9% ("three nines")	8.76 days
99.99% ("four nines")	52.56 minutes
99.999% ("five nines")	5.26 minutes

System Integrity addresses unanticipated operating conditions



Cybersecurity guards against Intentional faults and malicious actions



Attackers take in the Entire Landscape

ATTACK SURFACE

- The Device
- (Receives the most focus)

- Smartphone app
- (Everyone has one)

- Communications
- (The bit that makes it connected)

- The things the device connects to

- Cloud
- (via the Internet)

PHASES OF AN ATTACK

Investigation

Leverage a weakness

Rinse and repeat

Create an attack

Scale the attack

$$$$

Security by Design

Holistic coverage of the system from the ground up

High Availability

Malicious Fault - Tolerance

What an attacker might do

- Binary Modification
- Kernel Exploitation
- CAN/Network Injection
- Sensor Tampering

Self-Healing Systems Prepare for Attack

Binary-Level Integrity Verification

- Integrity Verification is the cryptographic means to identify if a binary has been tampered with by means of signing the payload at build time and validating at runtime.

- This should be done for the validation of firmware and image updates, but can also be used to validate individual programs.

- Without Integrity Verification there is no way to know that your system has been tampered with

Binary-Level Integrity Verification

- Like an IDS, Integrity Verification is only a detection, but it can trigger programmed responses that provide active mitigation.
- Failures on firmware load can halt the boot, or load the last known-good image
- Failures on OTA Update Images in systems that do A/B upgrades can invalidate the update, and request a new one while maintaining the known good OS
- Detection of failures does not have to do full system updates. The verification and response can be segmented into image sections, or even files.

Binary-Level Self Repair

- Error-Correcting Codes (ECC) have existed since the 1950s
  - Parity Bits, CRCs, and Hamming Codes
- Error-Correcting Hamming Codes were developed to correct punched paper tape read failures

“Damn it, if the machine can detect an error, why can’t it locate the position of the error and correct it”

Richard Hamming



- If we consider the data stream turned 90 degrees and replicated 7 times, this concept can be applied to data bytes within a program, able to repair 1- and 2-byte errors.

- Similarly, the idea can be expanded to multi-byte spans. The overhead for such a scheme can range between 4% and 30%.

Simple Branch Jam





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



Not-So Simple Branch Jam

When it repairs itself

Telemetry and Monitoring for Fleet-wide OTA

- Every security detection mechanism needs Telemetry
- Security Events need to be collected, aggregated and monitored externally.
- Monitor for indications that events have overwhelmed the in-vehicle defences
- OTA Security Update may be required regionally, or fleet-wide
  - Updates could be just to collect more data
- OTA Strategy is a complementary security aspect

Designing for Malicious Fault Tolerance

Designing for Malicious Fault Tolerance

Three things are needed to self-defend against an intrusion:

1. A way to detect the intrusion.

2. A local recovery mechanism when the problem is detected.

3. A fail-over mechanism that can be relied upon when a problem is detected and cannot be recovered.

Designing for Malicious Fault Tolerance

Beyond that, there are several additional considerations to make a robust, secure system:

- Multiple detection, local recovery, and fail-over mechanisms. (If one fails, the 2nd kicks in).
- Mechanisms placed at different levels of abstraction.
- An event logging, telemetry, and monitoring mechanism to track the occurrences of intrusion, local recovery, and fail-over in a set of systems.
- Security layers (defence-in-depth) to protect the detection, local recovery, fail-over, and logging mechanisms themselves.
- An incident response, disaster recovery, and remediation plan (e.g. monitoring & OTA updates).

Where you should think about Security



Product Development Lifecycle



Product Lifecycle

Security Tenants Moving Forward: Decoupling Protection Technologies



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Thank You

Industry News Room

Daily News & Views on Global Industry !!

May 13, 2019

Autonomous Vehicles Should Be Against Resistant To Cyber Attacks, Warn Insurers

BY KENNY BUNCH ON MAY 13, 2019